CUBA 2020 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Cuba is an authoritarian state with former president Raul Castro serving as the first
secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, the highest political entity of the state by
law, and Miguel Diaz-Canel serving as president of the republic. A new
constitution ratified in February 2019 codifies that Cuba remains a one-party
system in which the Communist Party is the only legal political party. Elections
were neither free nor fair nor competitive.
The Ministry of Interior controls police, internal security forces, and the prison
system. The ministry’s National Revolutionary Police are the primary law
enforcement organization. Specialized units of the ministry’s state security branch
are responsible for monitoring, infiltrating, and suppressing independent political
activity. The national leadership, including members of the military, maintained
effective control over the security forces. Members of the security forces
committed numerous abuses.
Significant human rights issues included: unlawful or arbitrary killings, including
extrajudicial killings, by the government; forced disappearance by the government;
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of political dissidents,
detainees, and prisoners by security forces; harsh and life-threatening prison
conditions; arbitrary arrests and detentions; political prisoners; significant
problems with the independence of the judiciary; and arbitrary or unlawful
interference with privacy. Freedom of the press functionally did not exist.
Criminal libel laws were used against persons who criticized government
leadership. The government engaged in censorship and internet site blocking, and
there were severe limitations on academic and cultural freedom. There were
severe restrictions on the right of peaceful assembly and denial of freedom of
association, including refusal to recognize independent associations. There were
severe restrictions on religious freedom. There were restrictions on internal and
external freedom of movement. Citizens were unable to change their government
through free and fair elections. Political participation was restricted to members of
the ruling party. There was official corruption; trafficking in persons, including
compulsory labor; and outlawing of independent trade unions.
Government officials, at the direction of their superiors, committed most human
rights abuses. As a matter of policy, officials failed to investigate or prosecute
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those who committed these abuses. Impunity for the perpetrators remained
widespread.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:
a. Arbitrary Deprivation of Life and Other Unlawful or Politically Motivated
Killings
On June 24, police killed Hansel Hernandez Galiano, an unarmed Afro-Cuban
man, in Havana. State media initially refused to acknowledge the case, but news
circulated quickly across social media. On June 25, the supposedly independent
but in fact state-controlled blog Guerrero Cubano issued a detailed story about
how Hansel was killed. Other official media outlets followed suit the morning of
June 27 when the Ministry of Interior issued a press release with the same account
of events related by Guerrero Cubano that was reprinted across official state
media.
The official version of Hernandez Galiano’s death was that in the course of a
regular patrol, two members of the National Revolutionary Police discovered and
chased a suspected thief. Official media stated the suspect ran from police but then
confronted them and threw large rocks, some of which hit the officers. The
government stated that as the suspect was throwing rocks, one officer fired two
warning shots and then a final killing shot. The press release concluded by
lamenting Hansel’s death but denigrated his character, claiming Hansel had been
found guilty of threatening persons, “lascivious abuse,” and robbery with violence,
for which he served a prison term and was on probation.
Outside observers identified a number of reasons to doubt the accuracy of the
government’s account. Photographs of the body circulated on social media by
Hernandez Galiano’s family members showed a single bullet wound, entering via
Hansel’s back and emerging from his chest, indicating he was running from the
officers, not actively confronting them. The photographs also showed bruising to
his face and sutures closing a cut to the head (possibly post mortem). Members of
his family said his body was reportedly quickly cremated, after pressure from the
government. Activists criticized the press release’s emphasis on Hansel’s alleged
criminal record, with one lawyer saying it “demonstrates their desire to treat him as
a defendant and not as a victim.” Authorities stated they would investigate the
death but as of December had not publicly released results of an investigation.
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At least eight prisoners died in custody in a variety of suspicious circumstances.
Roberto Jimenez del Sol, a manager in an army-owned shoe store, died in military
custody after spending one month in solitary confinement as part of an
investigation into missing funds. Although authorities told his family he died of
natural causes, his body displayed signs of abuse. The nongovernmental
organization (NGO) Cuba Archive documented at least six other prisoners who
died in suspicious circumstances. None of these deaths was reported by official
media.
b. Disappearance
There were confirmed reports of long-term disappearances by or on behalf of
government authorities. There were multiple reports of detained activists whose
whereabouts were unknown for days or weeks because the government did not
register these detentions, many of which occurred at unregistered sites.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment
There were recurring reports that members of the security forces and their agents
harassed, intimidated, and physically assaulted human rights and prodemocracy
advocates, political dissidents, and peaceful demonstrators, and that they did so
with impunity. Some detainees and prisoners endured physical abuse by prison
officials or other inmates at the instigation of guards. Although the law prohibits
coercion during investigative interrogations, police and security forces at times
used aggressive and physically abusive tactics, threats, and harassment during
questioning. Detainees reported officers intimidated them with threats of longterm detention, loss of child-custody rights, denial of permission to depart the
country, and other punishments.
State security officials frequently deployed to countries such as Venezuela and
Nicaragua, where they trained and supported other organizations in their use of
repressive tactics and human rights abuses and sometimes participated in the
abuses directly. For instance, Cuban security force members were embedded in
the Maduro regime’s security and intelligence services in Venezuela and were
instrumental in transforming Venezuela’s Directorate General of Military
Counterintelligence (DGCIM) from a small organization focused on external
threats to a much larger organization focused on surveilling Venezuelans and
suppressing dissent. UN reports accused the DGCIM of torture, and many former
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Venezuelan prisoners said that Cubans, identified by their distinctive accents,
supervised while DGCIM personnel tortured prisoners.
A December 2019 report from the Casla Institute, a Czech Republic-based NGO
focused on governance in Latin America, stated the Cuban ambassador in
Venezuela was personally involved in organizing this training. The Casla Institute
report also stated, “Cubans constantly instruct members of the FANB [Venezuelan
armed forces] and intelligence in techniques of repression, intimidation, and
monitoring, so that they carry out investigation work and spy on their own
colleagues and their families and political and social leaders, and directly intervene
in social unrest.”
Impunity was pervasive. There were no known cases of prosecution of
government officials for any human rights abuses, including torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.
Prison and Detention Center Conditions
Prison conditions were harsh and life threatening. There were reports that prison
officials assaulted prisoners. Prisons were overcrowded, and facilities, sanitation,
and medical care were deficient.
The government did not publish official statistics on its prisons. In January, citing
information from two senior Ministry of Interior officials, the Spain-based NGO
Cuban Prisoners Defenders claimed more than 90,000 persons were in prison, with
another 37,000 in other forms of custody such as labor camps, house arrest, or
conditional parole.
Physical Conditions: The government provided no information regarding the
number, location, or capacity of detention centers, including prisons, work camps,
and other kinds of detention facilities. Cuban Prisoners Defenders claimed the
government had more than 200 such facilities.
Prison and detention cells reportedly lacked adequate water, sanitation, light,
ventilation, and temperature control. Although the government provided some
food and medical care, many prisoners relied on their families to provide food and
other basic supplies. Potable water was often unavailable. Prison cells were
overcrowded. Women reported lack of access to feminine hygiene products and
inadequate prenatal care.
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In June political prisoner Walfrido Rodriguez Piloto told independent outlet
CubaNet he was denied medical care in El Arco del Chico prison camp in
Havana’s La Lisa municipality, where he said prisoners were fed less than two
ounces of food per day. He said, “This is a concentration camp; I have been here
for six days with nephritic colic and without any medical attention. Between the
mosquitoes [which carry dengue], the bed bugs, and hunger, I’m going to die
here.” He also complained that he was mistreated by fellow prisoners who did “the
dirty work” of authorities in exchange for benefits.
Prisoners, family members, and NGOs reported inadequate health care in prisons,
which led to or aggravated multiple maladies. Prisoners reported outbreaks of
COVID-19, dengue fever, tuberculosis, hepatitis, and cholera. There were reports
of prisoner deaths following official indifference to treatable medical conditions
such as asthma, HIV, AIDS, and other chronic medical conditions as well as from
suicide. Authorities rarely if ever supplied medicine. In May a member of the
opposition group Eastern Democratic Alliance posted on Facebook that one of
their members, Sandi Fernandez Ortiz, died in Mar Verde Prison in Santiago de
Cuba of sepsis due to poor medical care.
Political prisoners were held jointly with the general prison population. Political
prisoners who refused to wear standard prison uniforms were denied certain
privileges, such as access to prison libraries, reductions in the severity of their
sentence, or transfer from a maximum-security to a medium-security prison.
There were credible reports that prison officials assaulted inmates. Political
prisoners also reported that fellow inmates, acting on orders from or with the
permission of prison authorities, threatened, beat, intimidated, and harassed them.
In July the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) issued a
resolution granting precautionary protection measures to Silverio Portal Contreras,
who was arrested and beaten in March 2018 following a protest against unsafe
housing in Havana. The IACHR resolution detailed complaints made on behalf of
Contreras, including reports that following his July 2018 sentencing, prison
authorities severely beat Portal on multiple occasions and placed him in an
isolation cell, that he was losing his eyesight because of the beatings, that he was
denied medical attention for his multiple chronic medical conditions, and that he
was prohibited from contacting his family. In determining the gravity of risk to
Portal, the IACHR cited the context faced by human rights defenders in Cuba,
which it described as “generally characterized by a climate of hostility, abuse, and
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harassment, particularly with respect to those who have manifested opposition to
the government.” On December 1, Portal was released in poor health.
Prisoners reported solitary confinement was a common punishment for failure to
comply with prison regulations, and some prisoners were isolated for months at a
time. Some prisoners were held incommunicado, without being able to contact
friends or family until they were released.
The government subjected prisoners who criticized the government or engaged in
hunger strikes and other forms of protest to extended solitary confinement,
assaults, restrictions on family visits, and denial of medical care.
Administration: There were reports that prison officials assaulted prisoners, but
authorities did not investigate credible allegations of mistreatment. Prisoners
reported government officials refused to accept or respond to complaints.
Prisoners and pretrial detainees had access to visitors, although several political
prisoners’ relatives reported prison officials arbitrarily canceled scheduled visits or
denied visits altogether.
Authorities allowed prisoners to practice their religion, but there were isolated
reports authorities did not inform inmates of their right to religious services,
delayed months before responding to such requests, and limited visits by clergy to
a maximum of two or three times per year.
Independent Monitoring: The government did not permit independent
international or domestic human rights groups to monitor prison conditions, and it
denied access to detainees by international humanitarian organizations. Although
the government pledged in previous years to allow a visit by the UN special
rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or
punishment, no visit occurred during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention
The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and provides for the right of any
person to challenge the lawfulness of his or her arrest or detention in court.
Although the 2019 constitution adds explicit protections of freedom and human
rights, including habeas corpus, authorities did not observe them, nor did the courts
enforce them. The government denied a habeas corpus motion on behalf of
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political prisoner Jose Daniel Ferrer (see section 1.e., Political Prisoners and
Detainees), the only time it was known to have been filed.
Arbitrary arrests and short-term detentions increased and became a routine
government method for controlling independent public expression and political
activity. The government frequently detained activists arbitrarily without
informing them of any charges against them and often denied them the ability to
communicate with their relatives.
The government broadened arbitrary arrest powers under the pretext of controlling
the COVID-19 pandemic. In December the NGO Human Rights Watch released a
report documenting 34 cases in which authorities invoked rules concerning the
COVID-19 pandemic to target government critics and others. Documented cases
included Keilylli de la Mora Valle, a member of the Patriotic Union of Cuba
(UNPACU) political group, who was arrested on April 12 for lowering her mask to
smoke a cigarette on the street. She was sentenced to 18 months in prison after
protesting her treatment by police. In another incident, on November 26,
authorities claiming to be medical personnel entered San Isidro Movement
headquarters on the pretext of requiring a COVID-19 test of journalist Carlos
Manuel Alvarez who had arrived earlier in the year. They were followed by police
wearing medical gowns, who proceeded to arrest the protesters, several of whom
later stated they were beaten during the arrests. Officers told the dissidents that a
criminal complaint had been filed against them for “spreading an epidemic.”
The law requires that police furnish suspects a signed “report of detention,” noting
the basis, date, and location of any detention in a police facility and a registry of
personal items seized during a police search. Authorities routinely ignored this
requirement. Police routinely stopped and questioned citizens, requested
identification, and carried out search-and-seizure operations directed at known
activists. Police used legal provisions against public disorder, contempt, lack of
respect, aggression, and failure to pay minimal or arbitrary fines as ways to detain,
threaten, and arrest civil society activists. Police routinely conducted short-term
detentions in order to interfere with individuals’ rights to freedom of assembly and
freedom of expression, and at times assaulted detainees.
Police and security officials used short-term and sometimes violent detentions to
prevent independent political activity and free assembly. Such detentions
generally lasted from several hours to several days.
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The law allows for “preventive detention” for up to four years of individuals not
charged with an actual crime, based on a subjective determination of “precriminal
dangerousness,” which is defined as the “special proclivity of a person to commit
crimes, demonstrated by conduct in manifest contradiction of socialist norms.”
Mostly used as a tool to control “antisocial” behaviors such as substance abuse or
prostitution, authorities also used such detentions to silence peaceful political
opponents. Several of the more than 100 individuals considered to be political
prisoners by domestic and international human rights organizations were
imprisoned under the “precriminal dangerousness” provision of the law.
Arrest Procedures and Treatment of Detainees
Under criminal procedures, police have 24 hours after an arrest to present a
criminal complaint to an investigative police official. Investigative police have 72
hours to investigate and prepare a report for the prosecutor, who in turn has 72
hours to recommend to the appropriate court whether to open a criminal
investigation.
Within the initial 168-hour detention period, by law detainees must be informed of
the basis for the arrest and criminal investigation and have access to legal
representation. Those charged may be released on bail, placed in home detention,
or held in continued investigative detention. Once the accused has an attorney, the
defense has five days to respond to the prosecution’s charges, after which a court
date usually is set. Prosecutors may demand summary trials “in extraordinary
circumstances” and in cases involving crimes against state security. After the
COVID-19 pandemic started to spread in February, the Ministry of Justice
regularly invoked “extraordinary circumstances” in order to conduct summary
trials.
There were reports that defendants met with their attorneys for the first time only
minutes before their trials and were not informed of the basis for their arrest within
the required 168-hour period. In the case of summary trials for persons accused of
“propagating an epidemic” for allegedly violating COVID-19 restrictions, accused
persons were tried and sentenced without representation from legal counsel or the
opportunity to present any defense.
Reports suggested bail was available, although bail was typically not granted to
persons arrested for political activities. Time in detention before trial counted
toward time served if convicted.
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Detainees may be interrogated at any time during detention and have no right to
request the presence of counsel during interrogation. Detainees have the right to
remain silent, but officials do not have a legal obligation to inform them of that
right.
By law investigators must complete criminal investigations within 60 days.
Prosecutors may grant investigators two 60-day extensions upon request, for a total
of 180 days of investigative time. The supervising court may waive this deadline
in “extraordinary circumstances” and upon special request by the prosecutor. In
the case of the “extraordinary circumstances” waiver, no additional legal
requirement exists to complete an investigation and file criminal charges, and
therefore authorities may detain a person without charge indefinitely.
Arbitrary Arrest: Officials often disregarded legal procedures governing arrest.
They detained suspects longer than the legally mandated period without informing
them of the nature of the arrest, without allowing them to contact family members,
and without making legal counsel available to them. Police and security officials
continued to use short-term and sometimes violent detentions to prevent
independent political activity and free assembly. Such detentions generally lasted
from several hours to several days. After being taken into custody, these suspects
were typically fined and released. The record of the fines frequently lacked
information about the law that was broken or the name of the official responsible
for the fine, making the fines difficult to contest in court. Sometimes fines formed
the basis for preventing persons from leaving the country.
In connection with a planned yearly march on September 8, several activists from
UNPACU were arbitrarily detained on September 7. On September 8,
immediately after leaving his house with several supporters, UNPACU leader Jose
Daniel Ferrer and other supporters were arrested (see also section 2.b., Freedom of
Peaceful Assembly). Human rights NGOs reported at least 70 arrests and arbitrary
detentions linked to the September 8 “Sunflower Revolution,” a call for nonviolent
protests against the regime.
Pretrial Detention: The government held some detainees for months or years in
investigative detention, in both political and nonpolitical cases. In nonpolitical
cases, delays were often due to bureaucratic inefficiencies and a lack of checks on
police. The percentage of prisoners and detainees in pretrial detention was
unknown.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial
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While the constitution recognizes the independence of the judiciary, the judiciary
is directly subordinate to the National Assembly and the Cuban Communist Party
(PCC), which may remove or appoint judges at any time. Political considerations
thoroughly dominated the judiciary, and there was no separation of powers
between the judicial system, the PCC, and the Council of State.
Civilian courts exist at the municipal, provincial, and national levels. Special
tribunals convene behind closed doors for political (“counterrevolutionary”) cases
and other cases deemed “sensitive to state security.” Military tribunals may have
jurisdiction over civilians if any of the defendants are active or former members of
the military, police, or another law enforcement agency. The government denied
admission to trials for observers on an arbitrary basis.
Trial Procedures
The law provides for the right to a public trial, but politically motivated trials were
at times held in secret, with authorities citing exceptions for crimes involving
“state security” or “extraordinary circumstances.” Many trials concluded quickly
and were closed to the press. In April, on the basis of the COVID-19 pandemic
public health emergency, most trials were converted to summary trials, with many
defendants accused of poorly defined claims of “propagating an epidemic” or a
range of crimes referred to as “illicit economic activity,” such as hoarding scarce
goods. According to state media, in summary trials neither prosecutors nor
defense counsel need to be present, only a judge. This protocol, however, imposes
a limit on the length of the sentence. If the potential sentence exceeds one year,
defendants are to be assigned a lawyer. If persons hire a lawyer, they may bring
one; however, few persons received legal representation.
Due process rights apply equally to citizens and foreigners, but courts regularly
failed to protect or observe these rights. The law provides criminal defendants the
right not to be compelled to testify or confess guilt. The law presumes defendants
to be innocent until proven guilty, but authorities often ignored this, placing the
burden on defendants to prove innocence.
The law requires that defendants be represented by an attorney, at public expense if
necessary. Defendants’ attorneys may cross-examine government witnesses and
present witnesses and evidence. Private attorneys are not licensed to practice in
criminal courts, forcing defendants to rely on lawyers who work for the very
government that is prosecuting them. These attorneys reportedly were often
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reluctant to defend individuals charged with political crimes or associated with
human rights cases and in many cases did not appear to provide adequate counsel.
Criteria for admitting evidence were arbitrary and discriminatory. According to
reports, prosecutors routinely introduced irrelevant or unreliable evidence to prove
intent or they offered testimony about the defendant’s “revolutionary credentials,”
which are demonstrations of loyalty to the PCC or lack thereof.
Defense attorneys have the right to review the investigation files of a defendant
unless the charges involve “crimes against the security of the state.” In “state
security” cases, defense attorneys were not allowed access to investigation files
until charges were filed. Many detainees, especially political detainees, reported
their attorneys had difficulties accessing case files due to administrative obstacles.
Interpretation was sometimes provided during trials for non-Spanish speakers, but
the government claimed limited resources prevented interpreters from always
being available.
In trials where defendants are charged with “precriminal dangerousness,” the state
must show only that the defendant has a “proclivity” for crime, so an actual
criminal act need not have occurred. Penalties may be up to four years in prison.
Authorities normally applied this provision to prostitutes, alcoholics, young
persons who refused to report to work centers, repeat offenders of laws restricting
change of domicile, and political activists who participated in public protests.
The law recognizes the right of appeal in municipal courts but limits the right of
appeal in provincial courts to cases involving lengthy prison terms or the death
penalty.
Political Prisoners and Detainees
The government held political prisoners and detainees but denied it did so. It
refused access to its prisons and detention centers by international humanitarian
organizations and the United Nations.
The NGO Cuban Prisoners Defenders estimated there were 134 convicted political
prisoners serving sentences as of December 1. Other groups reported different
numbers, although figures consistently ranged near 100 or higher. The lack of
governmental transparency, along with systemic abuse of due process rights,
obscured the true nature of criminal charges, investigations, and prosecutions.
This allowed government authorities to prosecute and sentence peaceful human
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rights activists for criminal violations or “precriminal dangerousness.” The
government used the designation of “counterrevolutionary” for inmates deemed to
be political opposition, but it did not publicize the number of these inmates. The
government closely monitored organizations tracking political prisoner
populations, and the organizations often faced harassment from state authorities.
Political prisoners reported the government held them in isolation for extended
periods. They did not receive the same protections as other prisoners or detainees.
The government frequently denied political prisoners access to home visits, prison
classes, telephone calls, and, on occasion, family visits.
The justice system systematically subjected Jose Daniel Ferrer, head of UNPACU,
to a wide range of abuses after he was arrested in October 2019 with several
colleagues. While he was incarcerated, Ferrer was subjected to routine abuse from
fellow prisoners who told him they were being rewarded with special privileges by
prison authorities for beating him. During Ferrer’s detention, prison officials at
times withheld food and medicine and gave Ferrer only unclean water to drink.
Ferrer and his compatriots were convicted of spurious charges of lesiones
(inflicting grievous bodily harm) and false imprisonment after a 13-hour trial on
February 26 with numerous irregularities.
On the day of Ferrer’s trial, the Ministry of Justice tweeted that Ferrer would get a
fair trial but in the same tweet called him “a common criminal” in violation of his
right to the presumption of innocence. State media conducted a propaganda
campaign against him before his trial that alleged Ferrer was a habitual domestic
abuser (which was contradicted by past partners of his). Authorities tightly
cordoned off the courthouse and did not allow international observers; most
members of the audience were in fact members of the security services.
Authorities allegedly attempted to intimidate several defense witnesses. The court
ignored evidence (a recorded telephone conversation) from the alleged victim’s
wife that suggested the injuries to the alleged victim were the result of a
motorcycle accident rather than a beating. The court also ignored evidence that the
victim was coerced to testify on behalf of the prosecution.
Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies
It is possible to seek judicial remedies through civil courts for violations of
administrative decisions, but independent legal experts noted general procedural
and bureaucratic inefficiencies often delayed or undermined the enforcement of
administrative decisions and civil court orders. Civil courts, like all other courts in
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the country, lacked independence, impartiality, and effective procedural
guarantees. No courts allowed claimants to bring lawsuits seeking remedies for
human rights violations. On December 20, the National Assembly postponed
approval of the Law for the Claim of Constitutional Rights before the Courts,
which would have allowed for lawsuits related to rights protected in the
constitution.
f. Arbitrary or Unlawful Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence
The constitution provides for the protection of citizens’ privacy rights in their
homes and correspondence, and the law requires police to have a warrant signed by
a prosecutor or magistrate before entering or conducting a search. Officials,
however, did not respect these protections. Reportedly, government officials
routinely and systematically monitored correspondence and communications
between citizens, tracked their movements, and entered homes without legal
authority and with impunity.
Security forces conducted arbitrary stops and searches, especially in urban areas
and at government-controlled checkpoints at the entrances to provinces and
municipalities. Authorities used dubious pretenses to enter residences where they
knew activists were meeting, such as “random” inspections of utilities or spurious
reports of a disturbance. Authorities also used seemingly legitimate reasons--often
health-related--such as fumigating homes as part of an antimosquito campaign or
door-to-door COVID-19 checks as a pretext for illegal home searches.
On November 9, musician and activist Denis Solis was arrested for “contempt”
after he posted a video of himself verbally sparring with a lone police officer who
entered Solis’ home without permission and refused to produce a warrant.
Criminal procedure requires that officers may enter persons’ residences only with
another officer present, and also requires a warrant or exigent circumstances,
neither of which appeared to exist in this case. Solis, who had previously been
arrested twice for protesting restrictions on freedom of expression, was sentenced
to eight months in prison.
The Ministry of Interior employed a system of informants and neighborhood
committees, known as Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, to monitor
government opponents and report on their activities. Agents from the ministry’s
General Directorate for State Security frequently subjected foreign journalists,
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visiting foreign officials, diplomats, academics, and businesspersons to
surveillance, including electronic surveillance.
Family members of government employees who left international work missions or
similar activities (such as medical missions, athletic competitions, and research
presentations) without official permission at times faced government harassment or
loss of employment, access to education, and other public benefits. Family
members of human rights defenders, including their minor children, reportedly
suffered reprisals related to the activities of their relatives. These reprisals
included reduction of salary, termination of employment, denial of acceptance into
university, expulsion from university, and other forms of harassment.
Arbitrary government surveillance of internet activity was pervasive and frequently
resulted in criminal cases and reprisals for persons exercising their human rights.
Internet users had to identify themselves and agree they would not use the internet
for anything “that could be considered…damaging or harmful to public security.”
User software developed by state universities gave the government access to users’
personal data and communications.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Expression, Including for the Press
The constitution provides for freedom of expression, including for the press, on the
condition that the expression “conforms to the aims of socialist society.” The law
bans criticism of government leaders and distribution of antigovernment
propaganda, with penalties ranging from three months to 15 years in prison.
Freedom of Speech: The government did not tolerate public criticism of
government officials or programs, and it limited public debate of topics considered
politically sensitive. Several laws criminalize aspects of freedom of expression.
Rather than enforce these laws, police typically used other pretexts to harass and
arrest persons exercising freedom of expression. Among the individuals who
protested these restrictive laws was Luis Manuel Otero Alcantara, an artist and a
leader of the San Isidro Movement (MSI), an organization promoting cultural
independence. Several MSI members, such as rapper Maykel Osorbo and Otero
Alcantara’s partner Claudia Genlui, were arrested, beaten while in custody,
blackmailed by state security, and fined during the year. While some of these
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arrests were in conjunction with political events or Otero Alcantara’s art, many
arrests were arbitrary.
Otero Alcantara, arrested dozens of times in conjunction with his performance art,
was charged once, for “defiling national symbols,” a case that was dropped after he
spent 13 days incarcerated. He was arrested, among other times: on February 7,
for walking around Havana wearing a hard hat in protest of several individuals
killed when their state-owned house collapsed; on February 11, for protesting a
state television decision to censor a kiss between two men; on September 8,
moments after stepping outside his home holding a sign with a black and white
sunflower, referencing the country’s patron saint; and on October 10, after
gathering individuals to celebrate the anniversary of the Grito de Yara (Cry of
Yara, the 1868 start of the country’s independence struggle).
Otero Alcantara was also arrested several times while demonstrating for the
freedom of fellow MSI member Denis Solis, including on November 12 when
Otero Alcantara and another activist attempted to present a writ of habeas corpus
for Solis. Otero Alcantara was arrested on November 26 when authorities raided
his house to break up a hunger strike of MSI members. At year’s end he remained
on house arrest, despite the government’s not levying charges against him.
State security regularly harassed the organizers of independent debates on cultural
and social topics to force them to stop discussing matters deemed controversial.
The organizers reported assaults by state security, video surveillance installed
outside of venues, and detention of panelists and guests on the days they were
expected to appear.
Government workers reported being fired, demoted, or censured for expressing
dissenting opinions or for affiliating with independent organizations.
Alexander Raul Pupo Casas told independent media outlet CiberCuba that he was
forced out of his residency program in neurosurgery at the Ernesto Che Guevara
Hospital. His supervisor, Ponce de Leon Noriega, viewed Facebook posts from
Pupo Casas that were critical of the government, including its low salaries for
medical professionals. Noriega then publicly denounced Pupo Casas as
“counterrevolutionary” and started proceedings to expel him from the hospital.
Religious groups reported increased restrictions on expressing their opinions
during sermons and at religious gatherings, with authorities sometimes using
COVID-19 restrictions to prevent persons from worshipping. Most members of
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the clergy exercised self-censorship. Religious leaders in some cases criticized the
government, its policies, and the country’s leadership without reprisals. Other
religious groups, particularly those not officially state-sanctioned, reported
harassment and destruction of houses of worship.
Freedom of Press and Media, Including Online Media: The government or the
PCC directly owned all print and broadcast media outlets and all widely available
sources of information. News and information programming were generally
uniform across all government-controlled outlets. The government controlled all
printing presses and nearly all publications. The party censored public screenings
and performances. The government limited the importation of printed materials.
Foreign correspondents had limited access to and often were denied interviews
with government officials. Foreign correspondents struggled to gather facts and
reliable data for stories. The government harassed and denied access to
correspondents who reported stories deemed critical of the government. As a
result of self-censorship and lack of access, foreign journalists rarely published
stories on human rights violations while inside the country. Despite meeting
government vetting requirements, journalists belonging to state media institutions
who reported on sensitive subjects did so at personal risk, and the government
barred them from working for unofficial media outlets in addition to their official
duties. The government harassed and threatened any independent citizen
journalists who reported on human rights violations.
After Camila Acosta started working as an independent journalist in August 2019,
she endured nearly constant state harassment and other abuses for her work. Since
February she was forced to move at least six times (including several times during
the peak of the COVID-19 outbreak) due to police harassment of her landlords for
“hosting a dissident.” She was arbitrarily arrested, detained, abused, fined,
threatened, and interrogated at length on many occasions. For example, on July
31, she was waiting for friends in a park in Havana when two officers approached
her, asked for her identity document, arrested her, and took her to a police station.
Inside her bag they found several facemasks reading, “No to Decree 370,” a
reference to legalized surveillance of electronic communication without a court
order. The officers forced Acosta to strip and searched her further. Police fined
her and threatened further prosecution for protesting the decree. On March 9,
police arrested Acosta while she covered a demonstration for the freedom of artist
and activist Luis Manuel Otero Alcantara (see section 2.a., Freedom of Speech).
Police gave her a large fine and threatened her with “deportation” to her home
province, Isla de la Juventud.
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Violence and Harassment: The government did not recognize independent
journalism, and independent journalists frequently faced government harassment,
including detention and physical abuse. Most detentions were of independent
journalists who filmed arrests and harassment of activists or otherwise attempted to
cover politically sensitive topics. Community members and journalists for the
Cuban Institute for Freedom of Expression and of the Press reported increased
repression after President Diaz-Canel took office. Independent reporters
experienced harassment, violence, intimidation, aggression, and censorship, and
several were confined to their homes or prevented from traveling abroad. On
November 22, security forces allowed a progovernment mob to block registered
foreign media teams from reporting on protests for the freedom of Denis Solis in
Havana’s central park. Foreign media reported the mob “pushing, shoving, and
punching one cameraman four or five times in the body.”
Censorship or Content Restrictions: The law prohibits distribution of printed
materials considered “counterrevolutionary” or critical of the government. Foreign
newspapers and magazines were generally unavailable outside of tourist areas.
Distribution of material with political content--interpreted broadly to include the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, foreign newspapers, and independent
information on public health--was not allowed, and possession of these materials
sometimes resulted in harassment and detention. Government officials also
confiscated or destroyed cameras and cell phones of individuals to prevent them
from distributing photographs and videos deemed objectionable.
The government sometimes barred independent libraries from receiving materials
from abroad and seized materials donated by foreign governments, religious
organizations, and individuals.
Libel/Slander Laws: The government used defamation of character law to arrest or
detain individuals critical of the country’s leadership. Authorities frequently
arrested and charged persons with the vague crime of “contempt of authority.”
Internet Freedom
The government restricted access to the internet, and the country had a low internet
connectivity rate. All internet access was provided through state monopoly
companies, and the government has unrestricted and unregulated legal authority to
monitor citizens’ and foreigners’ use of email, social media, internet chat rooms,
and browsing. The government controlled all internet access, except for limited
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facilities provided by a few diplomatic missions and a small number of
underground networks. The government used a combination of website blocking,
pressure on website operators, arrests, intimidation, imprisonment, and unrestricted
surveillance to censor information critical of the regime and to silence its critics.
Despite heavy restrictions, citizens circumvented government censorship through
grassroots innovations. Access to blocked outlets was generally possible only
through a virtual private network.
For most internet users, the cost of accessing non-Cuban sites remained higher than
the cost of accessing domestic ones, most of which were controlled by the
government. Some individuals could connect at low or no cost via state
institutions where they worked or studied. The government closely monitored web
access points, such as Wi-Fi hotspots, cybercafes, and access centers, as well as the
backbone internet infrastructure, which was directly controlled by the government.
The government selectively granted censored in-home internet access to certain
areas of Havana and sectors of the population, consisting mostly of government
officials, established professionals, some professors, and students, journalists, and
artists. Others could access email and internet services through governmentsponsored “youth clubs,” internet cafes, or Wi-Fi hot spots approved and regulated
by the Ministry for Information, Technology, and Communications. Users were
required to purchase prepaid cards to access the internet.
During the year the government increased the number of Wi-Fi hot spots and
increased mobile service that allowed persons greater access to the internet on their
cell phones through the state telecommunications monopoly ETECSA without
needing to connect to public Wi-Fi. The cost of this improved service was far
beyond the means of most citizens; the cost of basic internet packages exceeded
the average monthly wage.
In addition to public Wi-Fi hot spots, citizens and foreigners could buy internet
access cards and use hotel business centers. Authorities reviewed the browsing
history of users, reviewed and censored email, and blocked access to websites the
government considered objectionable. The number of blocked websites fluctuated.
The government blocked approximately 20 websites on a regular basis, including
independent media outlets such as CiberCuba, 14yMedio, CubaNet, ADNCuba,
Tremenda Nota, Marti Noticias, and other websites critical of the government’s
human rights record. The government blocked access to Freedom House’s
Freedom on the Net report. The government blocked internet tools and websites
that the government considered contrary to its interests.
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Public reports revealed that the government monitored citizens’ internet use and
retaliated against them for their speech. The government selectively blocked the
communications of government critics to prevent them from communicating with
one another, sharing content, or reporting on government harassment. This
occurred, for example, when activists attempted to gather in protest of the killing
of Hansel Hernandez on June 30 (see section b., Freedom of Peaceful Assembly).
At least 20 activists and journalists had their connectivity to the internet severed by
the state that day.
Human rights activists reported frequent government monitoring and disruption of
cell phone and landline services prior to planned events or key anniversaries
related to human rights. ETECSA frequently disconnected the telecommunication
service of human rights organizers, often just before their detention by state
security or to disrupt planned activities. For example, artist and activist Tania
Bruguera reported that her internet access was blocked for at least 45 days after she
participated in protests on November 27 and was subsequently illegally confined to
house arrest.
Human rights activists reported government employees (“trolls”) tracked the social
media accounts of activists. Activists also reported on the government’s practice
of sending mass text messages warning neighbors to avoid association with
dissidents.
The government frequently targeted users of SNet (abbreviated from Street
Network), a grassroots system of user-owned and user-operated wireless networks
that allowed persons to exchange information outside of state control. While the
law does not set specific penalties for unauthorized internet use, it is illegal to own
a satellite dish that provides uncensored internet access, and authorities restricted
the use of networking equipment that was key to SNet. The government restricted
the importation of wireless routers, actively targeted private wireless access points,
and confiscated equipment. After tolerating the growth of SNet for years, the
government completed its expropriation of the system in 2019, and networks
outside of government control essentially ceased to exist.
The use of encryption software and the transfer of encrypted files are also
technically illegal, but information on enforcement of this restriction was not
available. Despite poor access, harassment, and infrastructure problems, a growing
number of citizens maintained news sites and blogs in which they posted opinions
critical of the government with help from persons living outside the country, often
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expatriate Cubans. The government blocked local access to many of these blogs.
In addition a small but growing number of citizens used Twitter, Facebook,
Instagram, Telegram, YouTube, and other social networks to report independently,
including observations critical of the government. Like other government critics,
bloggers faced government harassment, including detention, physical abuse, and
often the destruction or confiscation of their internet equipment and devices.
Academic Freedom and Cultural Events
The government restricted academic freedom and controlled the curricula at all
schools and universities, emphasizing the importance of reinforcing PCC rule
through “revolutionary ideology” and “discipline.” Most academics refrained from
meeting with foreigners, including diplomats, journalists, and visiting scholars,
without prior government approval. Government monitors were sometimes
present at these meetings. Those persons permitted to travel abroad were aware
that their actions, if deemed politically unfavorable, could negatively affect them
and their relatives in Cuba. Several university professors, researchers, and students
reported they were forced out of their positions, demoted, or expelled for
expressing ideas or opinions outside of government-accepted norms.
Outspoken artists and academics faced harassment and criticism orchestrated by
the government. According to the digital magazine Tremenda Nota, academics
and their students faced increased discrimination based on ideology and politics
during the year.
On October 8, the NGO Observatory of Academic Freedom, founded in July by
Cuban exiles, published the first of two reports on ideological discrimination in
Cuban universities. In remarks accompanying the presentation, “Political
Discrimination in Cuban Higher Education as a Violation of Academic Freedom,”
several former Cuban academics described the censorship and punitive actions that
led to their dismissals from university positions.
During the year universities adopted new admissions criteria to give greater weight
to prospective students’ ideological beliefs.
Public libraries required citizens to complete a registration process before the
government granted access to books or information. Citizens could be denied
access if they could not demonstrate a need to visit a particular library. Libraries
required a letter of permission from an employer or academic institution for access
to censored, sensitive, or rare books and materials. Some religious institutions
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organized small libraries. Independent libraries were illegal but continued to exist,
and owners faced harassment and intimidation.
b. Freedoms of Peaceful Assembly and Association
The government restricted freedoms of peaceful assembly and association.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly
Although the constitution grants a limited right of assembly, the right is subject to
the requirement that it may not be “exercised against the existence and objectives
of the socialist state.” The law requires citizens to request authorization for
organized meetings of three or more persons, and failure to do so carries a penalty
of up to three months in prison and a fine. The government tolerated some
gatherings, and many religious groups reported the ability to gather without
registering or facing sanctions. Christian Solidarity Worldwide, however, reported
that in other cases the government harassed leaders of house churches and owners
of homes where house church congregations met. Many house church leaders also
reported frequent visits from state security agents or PCC officials. Some reported
they received warnings from agents and officials that the education of their
children, or their own employment, could be “threatened” if the house church
leaders continued their activities.
Independent activists and political parties other than the PCC faced greater
obstacles than religious groups. State security forces often suppressed attempts to
assemble, even for gatherings in private dwellings and in small numbers. The
government refused to allow independent demonstrations or public meetings by
human rights groups or any others critical of any government activity.
The government routinely arrested individuals who attempted to assemble, by
either placing them under house arrest or taking them into custody if they left their
residences.
On November 27, a group of persons assembled outside the Ministry of Culture to
demonstrate against the government’s efforts to suppress protests. This was the
sole example of a protest successfully forming and being allowed to disperse
peacefully. At this event, well known cultural figures protested the government’s
treatment of the MSI and its members and demanded the “right to have rights.”
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On June 24, police killed Hansel Hernandez Galiano, an unarmed Afro-Cuban
man, in Havana (see section 1.a.). Prominent activists soon adopted a
#Justice4Hansel campaign and called for protests on June 30 at Havana’s Yara
Theater. On the eve of the planned protests, the government arrested scores of
potential protesters and deployed a sophisticated media campaign modeled on the
#BlueLivesMatter countermovement. Reportedly, no one actually arrived at the
protest site because at least 35 individuals were arrested and another 33 were held
under house arrest before the planned protest.
State communications monopoly ETECSA, part of the Ministry of
Communications, cut off internet access for targeted activists and independent
journalists. A state security official informed one activist he would not be allowed
to leave his house on June 30 and that whoever tried to attend the protest for
Hansel Hernandez Galiano would be arrested for “propagation of an epidemic.”
Jose Daniel Ferrer, the leader of UNPACU and the most prominent opposition
leader, endorsed the calls to protest. On June 30, police locked the front door to
his house from the outside, and when Ferrer and his 17-year-old son climbed out
from the roof to join the protest, police arrested them both. Two activists, artist
Luis Manuel Otero Alcantara and rapper Maykel Castillo, were also arrested and
taken into custody. (Days earlier, Otero Alcantara and Castillo had associated
themselves with the #Justice4Hansel movement.) Police subsequently violently
abused them and prevented them from filing a complaint. Everyone arrested for
the June 30 protest was released within two days, except for Diario de Cuba
reporter Jorge Enrique Rodriguez, who was held for five days after filming police
violence against two young persons.
On October 10, the anniversary of the Grito de Yara proclaiming Cuban
independence from Spain, the regime arrested--sometimes violently--more than 20
artists and activists in a crackdown on a peaceful demonstration for political
change organized by the San Isidro Movement in Havana. According to media
reports, the majority of the activists were held for approximately seven hours by
police.
On numerous occasions, the government, using undercover police and Ministry of
Interior agents, organized “acts of repudiation” by crowds organized to assault and
disperse persons who assembled peacefully. Persons in these crowds arrived in
government-owned buses or were recruited by government officials from nearby
workplaces or schools. Participants arrived and departed in shifts, chanted
progovernment slogans, sang progovernment songs, and verbally taunted those
who had peacefully assembled. The persons targeted by this harassment at times
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suffered physical assault or property damage. Government security officials at the
scene, often present in overwhelming numbers, did not arrest those who physically
attacked the victims, and they did not respond to victims’ complaints. Instead,
government security officials frequently orchestrated activities against protesters or
took direct part in physical assaults.
Freedom of Association
The government routinely denied freedom of association to citizens and did not
recognize independent associations. The law proscribes any political organization
not officially recognized. A number of independent organizations, including
opposition political parties and professional associations, operated as NGOs
without legal recognition, and police sometimes raided their meetings.
For example, the Damas de Blanco (Ladies in White), an association of female
political activists originally formed to protest the detention of their male relatives,
was subjected to arbitrary arrest whenever it tried to meet, constant surveillance of
the house that served as their headquarters, and harassment by state officials and
local PCC members.
Recognized churches (including the Roman Catholic humanitarian organization
Caritas), the Freemason movement, and a number of fraternal and professional
organizations were the only organizations legally permitted to function outside the
formal structure of the state or the ruling party. Religious groups are under the
supervision of the PCC’s Office of Religious Affairs, which has the authority to
deny permits for religious activities; it exerted pressure on church leaders to refrain
from including political topics in their sermons and often limited freedom of
movement for independent pastors.
Groups are required to register through the Ministry of Justice to receive official
recognition. Authorities ignored applications for legal recognition from new
groups, including several new religious groups, women’s rights organizations, and
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) rights organizations.
The lack of official recognition left group members open to potential charges of
illegal association.
The government gave preferential treatment to persons who took an active part in
PCC activities and mass demonstrations in support of the government. Preferential
treatments included valued public benefits such as admissions to higher education,
fellowships, and job opportunities.
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c. Freedom of Religion
See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at
https://www.state.gov/religiousfreedomreport/.
d. Freedom of Movement
There were increased restrictions on freedom of movement within the country,
foreign travel, and migration with the right of return. The government controlled
internal migration from rural areas to Havana, sometimes arresting and expelling
persons from Havana if authorities discovered their national identity card listed
them as living in another city. The government also barred some citizens and
persons of Cuban descent living abroad from entering the country, apparently on
grounds that these visitors were critical of the government, had “abandoned”
postings abroad as low-paid medical doctors, or had defected when they were
abroad as athletes. The government prevented many Cubans who normally were
residents in another country but who were caught in Cuba during the COVID-19
pandemic from leaving the country.
When former government employees emigrated from the country, sometimes their
family members lost public benefits or were denied passports to travel and join
their family members abroad. The law provides for imprisonment of up to three
years or a moderate fine for first-time “rafters” (those who attempted to depart the
country clandestinely, commonly using homemade vessels), although these
attempts were less frequent than in previous years. Most persons caught
attempting unauthorized departures via sea were detained briefly under quarantine
as a precaution against COVID-19. In the case of military or police defectors or
those traveling with children, the punishment could be more severe.
Under the terms of the 1994-95 U.S.-Cuba migration accords, the government
agreed not to prosecute or retaliate against migrants returned from international or
U.S. waters or from the Guantanamo U.S. Naval Station after attempting to
emigrate illegally, assuming they had not committed a separate criminal offense.
Some would-be migrants in these circumstances, however, alleged harassment and
discrimination, such as fines, expulsion from school, and job loss.
In-country Movement: Although the constitution allows all citizens to travel
anywhere within the country, establishing residence in Havana was restricted. The
local housing commission and provincial government authorities must authorize
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any change of residence. The government may fine persons living in a location
without authorization and send them back to their legally authorized residence.
There were reports that authorities provided only limited social services to illegal
Havana residents and at times restricted food purchases to a person’s official
neighborhood of residence. Police threatened to prosecute anyone who returned to
Havana after expulsion.
The law permits authorities to bar an individual from a certain area within the
country, or to restrict an individual to a certain area, for a maximum of 10 years.
Under this provision, authorities may internally exile any person whose presence in
a given location is determined to be “socially dangerous.” Dissidents frequently
reported authorities prevented them from leaving their home provinces, or that
authorities detained and returned the dissidents to their homes, even though the
dissidents had no written or formal restrictions placed against them.
Foreign Travel: The government continued to require persons from several
professional and social categories to obtain permission to emigrate. The affected
persons included highly specialized medical personnel; military or security
personnel; many government officials, including academics; and many former
political prisoners and human rights activists.
The government prohibited human rights activists, independent journalists, and
artists from traveling outside the country to attend events related to human rights
and democracy. The government used arbitrary or spurious reasons to deny
permission for human rights activists to leave the country to participate in
workshops, events, or training programs. Activists reported a significant increase
in interrogations and confiscations at the airport when arriving from abroad.
The government arbitrarily designated some persons as regulados (regulated
persons), meaning the government either prohibited them from receiving a passport
or from leaving the country. The policy did not appear to be supported by a legal
framework, and officials denied such a policy existed, declaring the law allows for
freedom of movement. Because the government did not acknowledge that persons
were prevented from leaving, those subject to the policy were left without any
recourse for an appeal. The tactic served not only to restrict the movement of
citizens but also their freedom of expression, because it was routinely applied
when individuals attempted to travel to speak at conferences.
e. Status and Treatment of Internally Displaced Persons
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Not applicable.
f. Protection of Refugees
The government allegedly cooperated with the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in providing
protection and assistance to refugees, returning refugees, asylum seekers, stateless
persons, and other persons of concern. Information about the extent of that
cooperation was not publicly available.
Access to Asylum: The constitution provides for the granting of asylum to
individuals persecuted for their principles or actions involving a number of
specified political grounds. The government has no formal mechanism, however,
to process asylum for foreign nationals and is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee
Convention.
Temporary Protection: On the small number of cases of persons seeking asylum,
the government worked with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for
Refugees to provide protection and assistance pending third-country resettlement.
In addition the government allowed foreign students who feared persecution in
their home countries to remain in the country after the end of their studies until
their claims could be substantiated or resolved.
g. Stateless Persons
The government regularly rendered citizens de facto stateless persons when it
withheld consular services from employees and their families as punishment for
abandoning a foreign work mission. There were reports of Cubans residing abroad
who were refused a passport or other proof of identity or citizenship, including for
direct return to Cuba. Children born abroad to Cuban citizens in these
circumstances were unable to obtain recognition of their Cuban citizenship and
may not have citizenship in their country of birth. Cubans residing outside of Cuba
for more than 24 months may lose full citizenship rights.
Section 3. Freedom to Participate in the Political Process
Article 5 of the constitution enshrines one-party rule by the PCC, disallowing
political expression outside of that structure. The government suppressed attempts
to form other parties. Candidates for office must be nominated by a PCC “mass
organization” and approved by local party officials. These PCC-approved
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candidates win the vast majority of votes, since electors are limited to PCC
representatives. Elections are neither free nor fair. Citizens do not have the ability
to form political parties or run as candidates from political parties other than the
PCC. The government forcefully and consistently retaliated against those who
sought peaceful political change. The government orchestrated mass political
mobilization on its behalf and favored citizens who actively participated.
Elections and Political Participation
Recent Elections: The government selected candidates for the October 2019
election for president of the republic, president of the National Assembly, and
membership in the Council of State. Only members of the National Assembly--all
of whom were PCC members--were allowed to vote, and candidates ran for office
uncontested. For the first time since 1959, on January 18, citizens “elected”
provincial governors. All of these “elections” were shams, however, since only
one candidate (chosen in theory by the president but in reality by the PCC) stood
for each post, and the only persons allowed to vote were loyal party members
chosen as delegates of the municipal assemblies in each province. The chosen
candidates were not known to the public before the election, and each one received
93 percent or more of the ballots cast, with most receiving 99 percent of the votes.
Political Parties and Political Participation: As in previous national elections,
government-run commissions nominated all candidates for office for the January
election. No non-PCC candidates were allowed on the ballot. The government
routinely used propaganda campaigns in the state-owned media to criticize its
opponents. Numerous opposition candidates were physically prevented from
presenting their candidacies or were otherwise intimidated from participating in the
electoral process.
The new constitution, approved in February 2019, includes many sections that
restrict citizens’ ability to participate fully in political processes by deeming the
PCC as the state’s only legal political party and the “superior driving force of the
society and the state.” For example, Article 4 states, “Citizens have the right to
combat through any means, including armed combat when other means are not
available, anyone who intends to overthrow the political, social, and economic
order established by this constitution.” The article effectively empowers ordinary
persons to attack violently those who publicly disagree with the party.
Citizens who live abroad without a registered place of abode in Cuba lose their
right to vote.
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Participation of Women and Members of Minority Groups: No law limits
participation of women or members of minority groups in the political process, and
they did participate. Women’s representation increased slightly from previous
years in the most powerful decision-making bodies, but women held no senior
leadership positions in the military or security services.
Section 4. Corruption and Lack of Transparency in Government
The law provides criminal penalties for corruption. The government was highly
sensitive to corruption allegations and often conducted anticorruption crackdowns.
Corruption: The law provides for three to eight years’ imprisonment for “illegal
enrichment” by authorities or government employees. The government did not
implement the law effectively, and officials sometimes engaged in corrupt
practices with impunity. There were numerous reports of police and other official
corruption in enforcement of economic restrictions and provision of government
services. For example, employees frequently stole products from government
stocks and sold them on the black market. Multiple persons reported that when
searching homes and vehicles, police sometimes took the owners’ belongings or
sought bribes in exchange for not imposing fines or arrests. Corruption by customs
officers was also reportedly common.
Financial Disclosure: The law does not require appointed and elected officials to
disclose their assets.
Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Abuses of Human Rights
The government did not recognize domestic human rights groups or permit them to
function legally. Several human rights organizations continued to function outside
the law, including UNPACU, the Christian Liberation Movement, the Assembly to
Promote Civil Society, and the Lawton Foundation for Human Rights. The
government subjected domestic human rights advocates to intimidation,
harassment, periodic short-term detention, and long-term imprisonment on
questionable charges.
No officially recognized NGOs monitored human rights. The government refused
to recognize or meet with NGOs that monitored or promoted human rights. There
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were reports of government harassment of individuals who met with unauthorized
NGOs.
The United Nations or Other International Bodies: The government continued to
deny international human rights organizations, including the United Nations, its
affiliated organizations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross, access
to prisoners and detainees. The government continued to deny or ignore longstanding requests from the UN special rapporteurs on torture, freedom of
expression, freedom of religion, and freedom of assembly to enter the country to
monitor human rights.
Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons
Women
Rape and Domestic Violence: The law criminalizes rape of women, including
spousal rape, and separately criminalizes “lascivious abuse” against both genders.
The government enforced both laws. Penalties for rape are at least four years’
imprisonment. Several reports from women’s rights advocacy groups, however,
suggested that crimes against women were underreported and that the state failed
to investigate many cases. The government recognized the high rate of femicide
for the first time in a report released in 2019, but as of October officials had not
responded to requests from human rights activists for a comprehensive law against
gender-based violence, despite increasing reports of femicide during the pandemic.
The online platform Yo Si Te Creo (I do believe you) documented at least 32
victims of femicide, including 29 Cuban women, two Canadian women, and three
minors. Official media sources failed to report any of these killings.
The government specifically targeted activists organizing a campaign called the
Red Femenina de Cuba (Cuban Women’s Network) that asked the state to update
information on crimes against women, train officials to handle crimes against
women, and define gender-based violence in the law. Police also targeted for
harassment small groups of women assembling to discuss women’s rights and
gender matters more broadly. The government opposed any non-state-sponsored
programs that focused on gender violence.
Security officials often refused to take serious action on cases of sexual violence,
including several cases where security officials were themselves implicated. In
September several soldiers were caught raping a 13-year-old girl. Three men were
arrested, but other suspects fled, and those who were arrested were freed the next
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day. The mother of the victim told the Red Femenina she went to police to protest
and was told that police did not have resources to investigate the case and that
trials were paused due to COVID-19 anyway. She said the officer warned her that
bringing further attention to the case in the independent press or on social networks
would be “counterrevolutionary” and could result in her arrest.
The law prohibits all threats and violence but does not recognize domestic violence
as a distinct category of violence. Penalties for violence range from fines to prison
sentences of varying lengths, depending on the severity of the offense.
Sexual Harassment: The law provides penalties for sexual harassment, with
potential prison sentences of three months to five years. The government did not
release any statistics on arrests, prosecutions, or convictions for offenses related to
sexual harassment during the year.
Coercion in Population Control: There were some reports of abortions performed
by government health authorities without clear consent from the mother. For
example, doctors were documented as having performed abortions or pressured
mothers into having an abortion when ultrasound scans revealed fetal
abnormalities because “otherwise it might raise the infant mortality rate.” Health
authorities used abortions to improve infant mortality statistics artificially by
preventing marginally riskier births in order to meet centrally fixed targets.
Discrimination: The law accords women and men equal rights, the same legal
status, and the same responsibilities with regard to marriage, divorce, parental
duties, home maintenance, and employment. No information was available on
whether the government enforced the law effectively.
Children
Birth Registration: Citizenship is normally derived by birth within the country’s
territory, and births were generally registered promptly.
Child, Early, and Forced Marriage: The legal minimum age of consent for
marriage is 18. Marriage for girls age 14 or older and for boys 16 or older is
permitted with parental consent. According to UNICEF, 26 percent of girls were
married before 18, with higher prevalence in the provinces of Oriente and Centro.
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Sexual Exploitation of Children: Prostitution is legal for individuals age 16 and
older. There is no statutory rape law, although penalties for rape increase as the
age of the victim decreases.
The law imposes seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for pornographic acts involving
minors younger than 16. The punishment may increase to 20 to 30 years or death
under aggravating circumstances. The law does not criminalize the possession of
pornography, but it punishes the production or circulation of any kind of obscene
graphic material with three months’ to one year’s imprisonment and a fine. The
offer, provision, or sale of obscene or pornographic material to minors younger
than 16 is punishable by two to five years in prison.
Child trafficking across international borders is punishable by seven to 15 years’
imprisonment.
The law does not establish an age of consent, but sexual relations with children
younger than 16 may be prosecuted if there is a determination of rape. In such
cases the law leaves room for consideration of possible consent and the age of the
other person, especially if the other person is also a minor. Penalties vary based on
the age of the victim, ranging from four to 10 years’ imprisonment if the victim is
age 14 or 15, up to 15 to 30 years’ imprisonment or death if the victim is younger
than 12.
International Child Abductions: The country is not a party to the 1980 Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction. See the Department of
State’s Annual Report on International Parental Child Abduction at
https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/International-Parental-ChildAbduction/for-providers/legal-reports-and-data/reported-cases.html.
Anti-Semitism
There were between 1,000 and 1,500 members of the Jewish community. There
were several reports of anti-Semitic acts.
In December 2019 local officials ruled against a Jewish family in Nuevitas,
Camaguey, who had fought to exercise their children’s right to wear religious
headgear (a kippah) in school. The children’s father, Olaine Tejada, said that Mary
Vidal, a local state prosecutor, forced him to sign a legal document acknowledging
that if his children came to school wearing a kippah on January 6, he and his wife,
Yeliney Lescaille, would be arrested and charged with “acts against the normal
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development of a minor,” with a potential one-year prison sentence. This followed
a long history of the children being threatened with expulsion and bullied by
schoolmates because of their faith. Tejada said the family would appeal to higher
authorities to reinstate their rights. No further developments were reported during
the year.
Trafficking in Persons
See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
Persons with Disabilities
No law prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Security oversees the Employment Program for Persons with
Disabilities. The law recommends that buildings, communication facilities, air
travel, and other transportation services accommodate persons with disabilities, but
these facilities and services were rarely accessible to such persons.
A large number of persons with disabilities who depended on the state for their
basic needs struggled to survive due to inattention and a lack of resources. Some
persons with disabilities who opposed the government were denied membership in
official organizations for persons with disabilities, such as the National Association
for the Blind. As a result they were denied benefits and services, which included
400 minutes of telephone usage, training in the use of a white cane and in braille,
and reduced fares on public transportation.
Members of National/Racial/Ethnic Minority Groups
Afro-Cubans often suffered racial discrimination, and some were subject to racial
epithets and beatings by security agents in response to political activity. AfroCubans also reported employment discrimination, particularly for positions of
prominence within the tourism industry, media, and government. Employment
advertisements were allowed to be openly sexist and racist. Police violence
intensified during the year, disproportionately affecting Afro-Cubans. Police
targeted Afro-Cubans for abuse during enforcement of laws requiring maskwearing in public and against informal commercial activity. The economic crisis
disproportionately affected Afro-Cubans, as seen in the scarce distribution of food
and continuous water shortages affecting Havana’s Afro-Cuban neighborhoods.
Although the regime’s defenders pointed to a few high-ranking Afro-Cuban
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officials, Afro-Cubans remained severely underrepresented in ministerial positions
and the Politburo, and they were completely absent from the highest ranks of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces and Ministry of Interior--seen as the country’s true
power centers.
Journalist Abraham Jimenez Enoa, hired on June 15 as a regular contributor to a
foreign newspaper’s opinion page, was put under house arrest after the newspaper
published an article on June 29 regarding Hansel Hernandez Galiano’s death in
which Jimenez said police violence in the country was racist. State media
subsequently formally attacked the foreign newspaper in a coordinated print and
television campaign, and security officials arrested Jimenez multiple times on
charges that observers considered baseless.
Acts of Violence, Criminalization, and Other Abuses Based on Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity
The law prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation in employment,
housing, citizenship, education, and health care but does not extend the same
protections to transgender or intersex individuals based on gender identity or
gender expression.
The government did not recognize domestic human rights groups or permit them to
function legally. Several unrecognized NGOs that promoted LGBTI human rights
faced government harassment, not for their promotion of such topics, but for their
independence from official government institutions.
Despite a history of state-sanctioned events in support of the LGBTI community,
the state-funded National Center for Sex Education was muted in its support for the
LGBTI community after canceling its annual conga (gay pride march) against
homophobia in 2019. Ariel Ruiz Urquiola, a biologist and activist for
environmental justice and LGBTI rights, alleged the government deliberately
infected him with HIV while he was detained after a peaceful protest for gay rights
in the wake of 2019’s cancelled pride march. He maintained that he always
practiced safe sex and asserted that the government knowingly injected him with
HIV when he was hospitalized during a hunger strike to discredit him because of
the social stigma of HIV in the country.
HIV and AIDS Social Stigma
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The government operated four prisons exclusively for inmates with HIV or AIDS;
some inmates were serving sentences for “propagating an epidemic.” Hospitals
and clinics sometimes discriminated against patients with HIV.
Special diets and medications for patients with HIV were routinely unavailable,
sometimes resulting in the patients’ deaths from neglect.
Political prisoner Maikel Herrera Bones, a person with HIV who was a member of
UNPACU, said prison officials withheld HIV treatment from him to pressure him
into silence. Herrera Bones was arrested on April 16 after arguing with a
plainclothes police officer about blackouts in his Havana neighborhood. Accused
of simple assault, Herrera Bones said he had not been tried in court by year’s end.
Section 7. Worker Rights
a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining
The law, including related regulations and statutes, severely restricts worker rights
by recognizing only the PCC-controlled Central Union of Cuban Workers (CTC)
as the paramount trade union confederation. To operate legally, a trade group must
belong to the CTC.
The law does not provide for the right to strike. The law also does not provide for
collective bargaining; instead it has a complicated process for reaching collective
agreements. The International Labor Organization raised concerns regarding the
trade union monopoly of the CTC, the prohibition on the right to strike, and
restrictions on collective bargaining and agreements, including giving government
authorities and CTC officials the final say on all such agreements.
The government prevented the formation of independent trade unions in all sectors.
The PCC chose the CTC’s leaders. The CTC’s principal responsibility is to
manage government relations with the workforce. The CTC does not bargain
collectively, promote worker rights, or advocate for the right to strike. The de
facto prohibition on independent trade unions virtually eliminated workers’ ability
to organize independently and appeal against discriminatory dismissals. The
government’s strong influence over the judiciary and lawyers limited effective
recourse through the courts. The government did not effectively enforce
applicable law, and penalties were not commensurate with those for other laws
involving denials of civil rights, such as discrimination.
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During the year, as in the past several years, Ivan Hernandez Carrillo, general
secretary of the Association of Independent Unions of Cuba, was harassed, beaten,
detained, threatened, and fined. In January he was arrested, fined, and had his cell
phone confiscated after he traveled to Havana from his home in Matanzas. A
government security officer told Hernandez the government would continue these
sorts of abuses if Hernandez tried to leave his town. The security officer implied
the government would fabricate criminal charges against Hernandez as it did to
UNPACU leader Jose Daniel Ferrer (see section 2.b.). After a representative of a
foreign embassy visited him on February 11, Hernandez was arrested for
questioning on February 12.
Several small, independent labor organizations operated without legal recognition,
including the National Independent Workers’ Confederation of Cuba, National
Independent Laborer Confederation of Cuba, and Unitarian Council of Workers of
Cuba. Together they constituted the Independent Trade Union Association of
Cuba. These organizations worked to advance the rights of workers by offering an
alternative to the state-sponsored CTC and advocating for the rights of smallbusiness owners and employees. Police reportedly harassed the independent
unions, and government agents reportedly infiltrated them, limiting their capacity
to represent workers effectively or work on their behalf.
b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor
The law does not explicitly prohibit forced labor. It prohibits unlawful
imprisonment, coercion, and extortion, with penalties ranging from fines to
imprisonment, but there was no evidence these provisions were used to prosecute
cases of forced labor. The use of minors in forced labor, drug trafficking,
commercial sex, pornography, or the organ trade is punishable by seven to 15
years’ incarceration. When the government discovered the involvement of
individuals or nongovernmental groups in these crimes, it enforced the law, and
penalties were commensurate with those for analogous crimes, such as kidnapping.
The government did not enforce laws against forced labor in its own programs.
Compulsory military service of young men was occasionally fulfilled by
assignment to an economic entity, such as a farm or company owned by the
military or by assignment to other government services.
Foreign entities both inside the country and abroad contracted with state-run
entities to employ citizens to provide labor, often highly skilled labor such as
doctors, engineers, or merchant mariners. These employees received a small
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fraction of the salaries paid to the state-run company, usually 10-25 percent or less;
the rest went into the government’s coffers. In some cases where workers were
paid directly by their foreign employers, they were required to give a portion of
their wages to the state.
Medical workers formed the largest sector of the government’s labor exports. The
NGO Cuban Prisoners Defenders collected testimony from 622 former medical
workers that documented the country’s coercive and abusive labor practices within
this sector. The workers described how they were forced to join the program and
were prevented from leaving it, despite being overworked and not earning enough
to support their families. Former participants described human trafficking
indicators, including coercion, nonpayment of wages, withholding of their
passports and academic credentials, and restriction on their movement. The
government denied all of these allegations. Similar practices occurred in the
tourism sector.
The government refused to improve the transparency of its medical missions
program or address concerns about forced labor, despite persistent allegations from
former participants, civil society organizations, and foreign governments.
Prisoners were subject to forced labor, often in strenuous farm work without
sufficient food or water, or working in hazardous environments without protective
equipment, such as working in production of industrial chemicals. Prisoners were
punished if they refused to work and were forced to make goods for the Ministry of
the Interior’s company (PROVARI or Empresa de Producciones Varias), which
were exported or sold in state stores and the tourism sector. The government used
high school students in rural areas to harvest crops (also see section 7.c.).
Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at
https://www.state.gov/trafficking-in-persons-report/.
c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment
The law prohibits all of the worst forms of child labor. The legal minimum
working age is 17, although the law permits the employment of children ages 15
and 16 to obtain training or fill labor shortages with parental permission and a
special authorization from the municipal labor director. The law does not permit
children ages 15 and 16 to work more than seven hours per day, 40 hours per
week, or on holidays. Children ages 15 to 18 may not work in specified hazardous
occupations, such as mining, or at night.
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There were no known government programs to prevent child labor or to remove
children from such labor. Antitruancy programs, however, aimed to keep children
in school. Children were subject to commercial sexual exploitation, and the
government did not report significant efforts to reduce the presence of child sexual
exploitation by tourists. The government investigated and convicted one
perpetrator of forced child labor during the year.
The government used some high school students in rural areas in the Escuela al
Campo (school to countryside) plan to harvest crops on government farms during
peak harvest time. Student participants were not paid but as compensation
received school credit and favorable recommendations for university admission.
Ministry of Education officials used the Escuela al Campo plan to make students
ages 11 to 17 work in the agricultural sector with no pay. Students were expected
to work 45 days during the first academic quarter. Failure to participate or obtain
an excused absence reportedly could result in unfavorable grades or poor
university recommendations, although students were reportedly able to participate
in other activities (instead of the harvest) to support their application for university
admission. Children who performed agricultural work under the Escuela al Campo
plan were not given proper tools, clothing, footwear, or food. Deficient and
unsanitary living conditions, coupled with poor infrastructure, exposed them to
diseases such as dengue fever, zika, and chikungunya.
d. Discrimination with Respect to Employment and Occupation
The law prohibits workplace discrimination against persons based on skin color,
gender, religious belief, sexual orientation, nationality, “or any other distinction
harmful to human dignity,” but it does not explicitly protect political opinion (see
section 7.a.), social origin, disability, age, language, gender identity, or HIVpositive status or other communicable diseases. No information was available on
government enforcement of these provisions during the year.
The government continued to use politically motivated and discriminatory
dismissals against those who criticized the government’s economic or political
policies. The government deemed persons “unfit” to work because of their
political beliefs, including their refusal to join an official union, and for trying to
depart the country illegally. The government penalized professionals who
expressed interest in emigrating by limiting their job opportunities or firing them.
A determination that a worker is “unfit” to work can result in job loss and the
denial of job opportunities. The government did not effectively enforce applicable
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law, and penalties were not commensurate with laws related to civil rights, such as
election interference. Persons forced out of employment in the public sector for
freely expressing themselves were often further harassed after entering the
emerging but highly regulated self-employment sector.
For example, Jorge Felix Vazquez Acosta was dismissed from his job in the Hotel
Packard when his superiors learned in May he was against socialism. The hotel
was owned by a subsidiary of the army-owned conglomerate Grupo de
Administracion Empresarial S.A. and operated by European company Iberostar. A
letter signed by the hotel’s deputy director stated Vazquez Acosta was fired for
comments “against our socialist system and the constitutional reform” as well as
actions that “undermine the political-ideological state that should prevail in our
workers.” In the military-controlled tourism sector, military intelligence officers
were often embedded in companies’ staff to investigate the political loyalty of
employees and fire individuals such as Vazquez Acosta when they were identified
as holding views critical of the government.
Discrimination in employment occurred against members of the Afro-Cuban and
LGBTI populations, especially in the state-owned but privately operated tourism
sector. Leaders within the Afro-Cuban community noted some Afro-Cubans could
not get jobs in better-paying sectors such as tourism and hospitality because they
were “too dark.” Afro-Cubans experienced low job security and were
underrepresented in the business and self-employed sector, frequently obtaining
lower-paying jobs, including cleaning and garbage disposal, which had no
interaction with tourists, a major source of hard currency.
Hiring practices in the private sector were racist, colorist, and sexist. A job posting
for an accounting or finance position usually called for women with lighter or olive
skin, blonde hair, and physically fit. Postings for bodyguards and security jobs
normally sought male candidates of color, who were perceived as being stronger
than other races.
There was no information available showing whether the government effectively
enforced applicable law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work
Authorities set a national minimum wage at a rate below the poverty line.
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The standard workweek is 44 hours, with shorter workweeks in hazardous
occupations such as mining. The law provides workers with a weekly minimum
24-hour rest period and one month of paid annual vacation per 11 months of
effective work. These standards apply to state workers as well as to workers in the
nonstate sector, but they were seldom enforced in the nonstate sector.
The law does not prohibit obligatory overtime, but it generally caps the number of
overtime hours at 16 hours per week and 160 per year. The law provides few
grounds for a worker to refuse to work overtime below these caps. Compensation
for overtime is paid in cash at the regular hourly rate or in additional rest time.
The government did not effectively enforce applicable law, and penalties were not
commensurate with those for other laws involving denials of civil rights, such as
discrimination.
The government set workplace occupational safety and health (OSH) standards and
received technical assistance from the International Labor Organization to
implement them. Information about penalties for violations of OSH law was not
publicly available. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security enforced the
minimum wage and workhour standards through offices at the national, provincial,
and municipal levels, but the government did not effectively enforce OSH
standards. No information was available regarding the number of labor inspectors.
Reports from recent years suggested there were very few inspectors, and OSH
standards frequently were ignored or weakened by corrupt practices. Civil society
organizations reported working conditions for doctors in hospitals were severely
unsanitary and that doctors worked long hours without sufficient access to food.
According to government statistics, approximately 250,000 self-employed
workers, or 41 percent of the 606,000 persons in the sector, voluntarily suspended
their licenses to work due to the economic crisis related to the COVID-19
epidemic. Most self-employed workers worked directly in the tourism sector or in
fields that support it. With most international flights suspended, the tourism sector
atrophied. The lack of clear regulations about what activities were permissible
(when it was clear that some were not) prevented persons from finding
employment in this sector.
Despite criminal penalties for doing so, a significant number of workers
participated in the informal economy, including individuals who actively traded on
the black market or performed professional activities not officially permitted by the
government.
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Self-employed persons, such as fruit sellers, bicycle taxi drivers, and others, were
frequently targeted by police for allegedly acting illegally, even when licensed.
Police sometimes arbitrarily and violently closed down these businesses and
confiscated any goods.
Foreign companies operated in a limited number of sectors, such as hotels, tourism,
and mining. Such companies operated via joint ventures in which the government
contracted and paid company workers in pesos for a salary that was a small
fraction of what the foreign company remitted in hard currency to the state for
labor costs. Most formal employment took place only through government
employment agencies. Employers, including international businesses and
organizations, were generally prohibited from contracting or paying workers
directly, although many reportedly made informal supplemental payments in the
form of gratuities.
The Ministry of Labor enforces labor law on any business, organization, or foreign
governmental agency based in the country, including wholly foreign-owned
companies operating in the country, joint-stock companies involving foreign
investors operating in the country, the United Nations, international NGOs, and
embassies. Workers employed by these entities are subject to labor regulations
common to most state and nonstate workers and are also subject to some
regulations specific to these kinds of entities. Government bodies, including the
tax collection agency and the Ministry of Finance and Prices, enforced regulations.
On July 6, a total of 13 military personnel were hospitalized and 1,245 persons
near La Pua were evacuated after old ammunition exploded in a military facility in
Holguin. Following the initial major explosions, workers in nearby fields
continued to feel several small explosions throughout the day. They received no
information about the cause or the response from the government or military.
The CTC provided only limited information to workers about their rights and at
times did not respond to or assist workers who complained about hazardous
workplace conditions. It was generally understood that workers could not remove
themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing their employment, and
authorities did not effectively protect workers facing this dilemma.
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